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1. I           
Consider a frictionless economy in which agents care about future consumption and have
unfettered access to a saving instrument. In such a world, as originally shown by Aaron
(1966), there can be no role for unfunded public pensions or pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social
security unless the gross real return on the saving technology (call it R) is dominated by
the return on social security — Samuelson’s (1958) biological interest rate or the gross pop-
ulation growth rate, n. If saving is done via capital accumulation and capital is productive,
then R < n implies the economy is overaccumulating capital — it is dynamically ineﬃcient.
In that case, as Samuelson (1975) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989) have explained, in-
troducing unfunded public pensions may be welfare improving if they crowd out private
saving, hence diminishing the incentive to overaccumulate capital. Realistically speaking,
though, since most real-world economies are very likely dynamically eﬃcient (where R > n)
and yet have supported PAYG social security historically, the question remains: what is
the rationale for PAYG social security in dynamically eﬃcient economies, if any?
Myopia or shortsightedness is often oﬀered as a rationale for public pensions. As Kot-
likoﬀ (1987) puts it, “There seems to be an unstated belief that, left to their own devices,
a sizeable fraction of households would inadequately save and insure.” Presumably, in-
suﬃcient foresight is to blame here. In that case, it seems intuitively plausible that a
paternalistic government could improve the welfare of such shortsighted people via the
forced-saving element present in PAYG social security. In fact, such “paternalistically mo-
tivated forced savings constitutes an important, and to some the most important, rationale
for social security retirement systems.” (Kaplow, 2008).
The seminal, formal contribution in this area is Feldstein (1985) with a follow-up in
Feldstein and Leibman (2002). Feldstein (1985) studies a simple two-period overlapping
generations (OG) model with productive capital but an exogenously-ﬁxed marginal product
of capital (a ﬁxed return-rate R). Therein, he poses the problem of optimal social security
system design — choosing the parameters of a PAYG program by maximizing the lifetimeO  M         R             S      S        3
welfare of agents who take those parameters as given. He simultaneously introduces two
types of deviations from perfect foresight, namely, i) myopia (or shortsightedness): agents
attach lower weight to future utility compared to what their own “true” preferences would
suggest (alternatively, a setting in which the agent uses a discount rate of ρ < 1 compared to
no discounting by a benevolent, yet paternalistic government), and ii) pension pessimism:
agents perceive they will get only a fraction α of the pensions due to them. Feldstein’s
original question of optimal pension design can be reformulated as, when are optimal
public pensions positive? He concludes that substantial myopia may justify positive public
pensions even if R > n, but the optimal level of social beneﬁts may be low once it is
recognized that private savings are reduced in anticipation of the pension.1 It is this
celebrated result that underlies our faith in myopia as the “most important rationale” for
PAYG social security.
A potential lacuna in Feldstein’s analysis, one that seems to have gone unnoticed,
is his failure to impose a non-negativity constraint on private savings. This turns out
to have several profound implications. In Section 2, the current paper revisits the issue
of optimal pensions in an OG model without productive capital, but with a linear storage
technology and exogenously-ﬁxed return-rate2 R. Therein, we show that with myopia alone,
an equilibrium with positive private saving and positive public beneﬁts is not possible —
either a positive public pension is optimal with R > n > Rρ (enough myopia), but then
private saving is zero (at a corner), or if private saving is positive (Rρ > n), the optimal
public pension is zero. In other words, insuﬃcient foresight can oﬀer a rationale for PAYG
social security in a dynamically eﬃcient economy, but then private saving is fully crowded
out. A fairly broad intuition for this is that agents perceive private saving and PAYG
social security as two competing “assets” and exclusively choose the one with the dominant
return.
1Feldstein (1985) seems unaware that suﬃciently strong pension pessimism along with enough myopia
is needed for this result — a point we elaborate below.
2This may be interpreted as a small open economy case.O  M         R             S      S        4
A similar one-or-the-other result holds with pension pessimism. Indeed, we show that
pension pessimism alone is not suﬃcient to produce an equilibrium with interior private
savings and public pension — a point missed by Feldstein (1985) and Feldstein and Leibman
(2002).3 More generally, we explore the exact relation between myopia and pension pes-
simism that is needed to ensure an interior solution (positive optimal beneﬁts and positive
private savings).4 We prove that a necessary condition for such a solution is that for a given
level of pension pessimism, myopia can neither be too weak, and somewhat surprisingly,
nor too strong. Is heterogeneity with respect to time preference suﬃcient to ensure an
equilibrium with positive savings and positive public pensions? We show that it is not.
The above results had a discomforting bang-bang feel to them, the upshot being that
coexistence of positive optimal public pensions and private saving was not possible. It
turns out that the assumption of a exogenous return-rate was crucial to generating this
outcome. In Section 3, we go on to show that with a concave neoclassical technology (and
hence an endogenous return-rate), the bang-bang feature does not arise. More precisely, we
prove that at a stable dynamically-eﬃcient steady state in the standard Diamond (1965)
OG model, under suﬃciently high myopia, coexistence of interior public pensions and
private saving is possible. Heuristically speaking, this happens because the return-rate
(the marginal product of capital) rises as capital gets crowded out by pensions, preventing
future private saving from plummeting to zero. It also deserves mention here that with
an endogenous return-rate, pension pessimism is not necessary to generate an equilibrium
with both positive private savings and public pension — myopia is enough.
3Ironically, Feldstein (1985) requires enough pension pessimism to ensure positive public beneﬁts and
suﬃciently high equilibrium private savings, and yet, he oﬀers myopia (and insuﬃcient savings) as the
rationale for a PAYG pension scheme.
4This issue gets clouded in Feldstein (1985) because he assumes speciﬁc functional forms, relies on
numerical computations, and does not impose a non-negativity constraint on private savings.O  M         R             S      S        5
2. T                                         
Consider a simple two-period overlapping generations model. There is a continuum of
agents of unit measure born at each date (n = 1), and they each live two periods. Agents
are endowed with w > 0 units of the good only when young. All agents also have access to
a simple linear storage technology: 1 unit invested in this technology in any period yields
an exogenously-speciﬁed R ≶ 1 units of output the following period.
There is a government that runs a simple PAYG social security program: it imposes a
proportional tax τ on young-age endowments and uses the proceeds to ﬁnance a lump-sum
pension B ≥ 0 to the current old. The government budget constraint is given by τw = B.
The government is benevolent in the sense that it chooses B by maximizing lifetime utility
of a representative agent; it then picks the τ to generate the appropriate revenue.
Let ci denote consumption of the single perishable good as young (i = 1) and old
(i = 2), respectively. We make a distinction between the true and choice utility of agents,
implying that agents act myopically.5 Agents’ behavior is dictated by their choice utility,
but their actual well-being, the yardstick for calculations of social welfare, is governed by
their true utility. All agents have “true” preferences over consumption in each period of life
that are summarized by a utility function U (c1,c2) = u(c1) + ρgv(c2), where ρg ∈ [0,1],
u and v are twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave functions
with u′ (0) = v′ (0) = ∞.6 Agents make their savings decision based on the utility function
U (c1,c2) = u(c1) + ρpv(c2), where ρp ∈ [0,1]. When ρp < ρg choices are made with
insuﬃcient weight on second period utility, i.e. agents are myopic. If ρp = 0, they are
“completely myopic” (place no weight on the future) and have no reason to save (“hand-
to-mouth”); if ρp = ρg, they are not myopic. We assume ρp ≤ ρg ≤ 1.
5This follows recent developments in the so-called behavioral public ﬁnance literature, see e.g., McCaﬀery
and Slemrod (2004) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2007).
6In the parlance of behavioral economics, myopia is really a problem of self control or hyperbolic dis-
counting. To see this, following Kaplow (2006), one can write the choice utility of agents as
U (c1,c2) = βu(c1) + δv (c2)
where β >> 1 and δ ∈ (0,1); the true utility sets β = 1.O  M         R             S      S        6





c1 = (1 − τ)w − S
c2 = RS + B
c1 > 0, c2 > 0, S > 0
where S denotes saving. Given a B, an interior solution to this problem is described by
S ≡ S (B) > 0 and S < (1 − τ)w. Since u′ (0) = ∞, we are assured that any solution
will satisfy S < (1 − τ)w; henceforth, in all that we do below, we will ensure S > 0 (the
non-negativity constraint on saving) holds in any equilibrium. The ﬁrst order condition
that determines an interior level of S is given by
u′ (c1) = Rρp v′ (c2) ⇔ u′ ((1 − τ)w − S (B)) = Rρpv′ (RS (B) + B). (1)
The government does not share the myopia of private agents, and hence it may be
labeled “paternalistic”. The government is assumed to be benevolent, interested in maxi-
mizing the stationary lifetime utility of a representative agent. It recognizes that a change
in the amount of pension beneﬁts has two eﬀects on the private agent’s saving: it inﬂuences
the agent’s after-tax endowment and also his future income. The government takes the
agent’s optimal saving response to its pension as given and solves the following program
in order to compute the optimal level for B :
max
B
U (B) ≡ u(w − B − S (B)) + ρgv(RS (B) + B)
The optimal level of B, if positive, is deﬁned as the solution to
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We assume that if (2) has a solution, it is a unique solution.
To foreshadow, below we show that in the absence of myopia, the optimal B is never
positive if R > 1. If enough myopia is present, the optimal B may be positive but never
alongside S > 0.
2.1. Benchmark case: no myopia. In this case, ρp = ρg. The following is a restate-
ment of a classic result due originally to Aaron (1966) and expounded in Blanchard and
Fischer (1989).
Proposition 1. If private agents do not suﬀer from myopia, the government would provide
a positive level of pension beneﬁts if and only if R < 1.
Proof. Let ρp = ρg = ρ. Using the ﬁrst order condition to the agent’s problem, u′ (c1) =
Rρv′ (c2), we have from (2) that










= ρv′ (c2)(1 − R).
Hence U′ (B = 0)   0 for R ⋚ 1.
Proposition 1 provides a simple condition: PAYG social security is justiﬁed on welfare
grounds if and only if R < 1 (dynamic ineﬃciency). Since the point of this paper is
to investigate the role of myopia in rationalizing social security in dynamically eﬃcient
economies, from here on, we assume:
Assumption (Dynamic eﬃciency)
R > 1.
For future reference, we have that the private savings response to a change in public



















Rρpv′′ (c2) + u′′ (c1)
[u′′ (c1) + R2ρpv′′ (c2)]
< 0O  M         R             S      S        8
(3)




≥ −1 if R ≥ 1.
2.2. Myopic agents. In this case, agents attach a strictly lower weight to their future
than what their “true” preferences imply, i.e., ρp < ρg. Using (2) and (1), it is easily
checked that
U′ (B) = v′ (c2)
￿






implying, at an interior, that the optimal B satisﬁes







From the point of view of the government, the optimal level of public beneﬁts requires
that the optimal saving response to an increase in pension is given by (4). But, to the





Rρpv′′ (c2) + u′′ (c1)
[u′′ (c1) + R2ρpv′′ (c2)]
. (5)
If an equilibrium with both an interior S and an interior value for B is to exist, these two
saving responses must be identical.
Proposition 2. Under myopia, i.e., when ρp < ρg, there does not exist an equilibrium
with S > 0 and B > 0.




Rρpv′′ (c2) + u′′ (c1)
[u′′ (c1) + R2ρpv′′ (c2)]O  M         R             S      S        9
must hold. Cross multiplying, this reduces to
[ρg − Rρp]
￿
u′′ (c1) + R2ρpv′′ (c2)
￿
= R(ρg − ρp)
￿
Rρpv′′ (c2) + u′′ (c1)
￿
which upon some simpliﬁcation yields
ρg (1 − R)u′′ (c1) = R2 (ρp)
2 v′′ (c2)(R − 1).
Since R > 1 and u′′,v′′ < 0, the left hand side of the above equation is positive while the
right hand side is negative. Hence, the contradiction.
As the following corollary makes clear, the optimal pension is never positive when
private saving is positive.
Corollary 1. Under myopia, i.e., when ρp < ρg, the optimal pension is positive when
Rρp < ρg, but then private saving is zero.
Proof. At an interior S > 0,
u′ (w − B − S (B)) = Rρpv′ (RSp(B) + B)
holds, which implies that at the corner, S = 0, we must have
u′ (w − B) > Rρρv′ (B).
In that case, the optimal B is the solution to the program
max
B
U (B) ≡ u(w − B) + ρgv (B)
or, the optimal B when S = 0 satisﬁes
u′ (w − B) = ρgv′ (B)
From the agent’s problem, it follows that
u′ (w − B) > Rρpv′ (B) =
Rρp
ρg u′ (w − B) ⇔ ρg > Rρp.O  M         R             S      S       
Notice that optimal pension is positive only when myopia is strong enough so as to
drive Rρp (recall R > 1) below ρg. The intuition for Corollary 1 is somewhat like this.
With exogenous wage income, the proportional tax does not distort. Agents perceive two
alternative means of transferring income to their retirement years: they can either save 1
unit on their own at a perceived (eﬀective) return of Rρp < R, the latter being the true
return, or they can pay 1 unit in taxes and receive an eﬀective return of ρg ×1 (since there
is no population growth) generated by a PAYG system. If Rρp < ρg, the agent prefers to
go with the pension system and saves nothing on his own.
The rationale for public pensions is that agents save too little due to myopia. However,
once a public pension is oﬀered, private agents lower their savings since they, given their
choice utility, ﬁnd that the sum of private savings and public pensions leave too high a
consumption level in the future. This drives private savings to a corner where they are fully
crowded out.7 Clearly, agents are better oﬀ under the public pension scheme evaluated
in terms of the true utility, although they are worse oﬀ assessed in terms of their choice
utility. The bottom line is this. Myopia of agents has been touted as the main reason for
why public pensions are a good idea. The above results indicate that while enough myopia
may generate a rationale for public pensions it also implies that private savings are fully
crowded out.8
2.3. Pension pessimism. Feldstein (1985) introduced the idea that individuals may
“myopically” believe they will get only a fraction α ∈ [0,1] of beneﬁts due to them. Below,
we investigate the role played by pension pessimism in generating a rationale for public
pensions.
7A mandatory level of pension savings may overcome this problem. However, as shown in Cremer et.al.
(2008) this is not necessarily optimal once agent heterogeneity and labor supply distortions are allowed.
8This result generalizes to a very general form of myopia/paternalism. Private agents perceive their
lifetime utility to be given by u(c1)+z (c2) while their true preferences are captured instead by u(c1)+v (c2).
It is easy to verify that the problem of co-existence of positive pensions and interior private saving would
remain even for this very general speciﬁcation.O  M         R             S      S        11
Henceforth, without any loss of generality, assume ρg = 1 and ρ ≡ ρp. Then, the
problem of the private agent — who takes B parametrically given — is given by
max
c1,c2
u(c1) + ρv (c2)
subject to
c1 = (1 − τ)w − S
c2 = RS + αB
c1 > 0, c2 > 0.
Analogous to what was discussed above, the ﬁrst order condition to the private agent’s
problem that determines an interior choice of S is given by
u′ (c1) = Rρv′ (c2) ⇒ u′ ((1 − τ)w − S) = Rρv′ (RS + αB),




Rραv′′ (c2) + u′′ (c1)







[u′′ (c1) + R2ρv′′ (c2)]
< 0.
i.e., the more pessimistic agents are about future pensions, the more they save.
Turning to the government’s optimal interior choice of B (for ρp ≡ ρ and ρg = 1 and
α = 1), we have that it is deﬁned by
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If there is to exist an interior optimal S and B, the saving response of an increase in B
from the point of view of the agent must coincide with that of the government, or
Rραv′′ (c2) + u′′ (c1)






Proposition 3. If ρ = 1 and α < 1, then for R > 1, there does not exist an interior




where ρ > 0 and
ρ < 1−α
R−α < 1.
Proof. It is easily checked that (6) reduces to
0 = u′′ (c1)(1 − R) + R2ρv′′ (c2)[(1 − α) + ρ(α − R)]. (7)
The ﬁrst term on the r.h.s of (7) is positive; hence, for an interior solution, the second term
has to be negative. Clearly, for ρ = 1, the second term reduces to R2ρv′′ (c2)(1 − R) > 0.
This proves that there does not exist an interior optimal choice for B and S when ρ = 1.
Similarly for ρ = 0, the second term is zero. Hence, an interior solution requires
ρ[(1 − α) + ρ(α − R)] =
u′′ (c1)(R − 1)
R2ρv′′ (c2)
> 0. (8)
It follows that a necessary condition for an interior optimal choice for B and S is that




Since the l.h.s. of (8) is a quadratic function in ρ and α − R < 0, it follows that (8) only




where ρ > 0 and ρ < 1−α
R−α < 1.
Notice from (7) above that neither for ρ = 0 nor for ρ = 1 is an interior solution to B
and S possible! Hence for a given α, ρ can neither be too high nor too low for an interior
solution with positive public beneﬁts and private savings to exist.
The implication is clear. Pension pessimism alone (i.e., without accompanying myopia)
is not enough to generate an equilibrium with positive savings and positive public pensions.O  M         R             S      S        13
As we show below, the assumption of neoclassical technology can generate such an equilib-
rium without need for pension pessimism. In passing, also note that Feldstein (1985) needs
a suﬃciently low α in order to ensure positive savings in equilibrium, i.e., enough pension
pessimism strengthens the motive for private savings. Ironically, this keeps the size of the
pension program “modest” — if agents are pessimistic and do not expect any pension, there
is no need to give them one!
2.4. Heterogenous agents. In some parts of his analysis, Feldstein (1985) allows for
the possibility of time-preference heterogeneity. Speciﬁcally, he considers an economy in
which a ﬁxed fraction of agents is completely myopic (ρ = 0). In the literature, these are
referred to as “hand-to-mouth” consumers, who save nothing. The remaining fraction of
agents is assumed to be non-myopic. Below, we study a slightly more general setting that
nests the aforediscussed Feldstein formulation: we assume that a fraction (λ) of agents is
myopic with a time preference ρm, and the remaining fraction has time preference ρnm,
where ρnm > ρm ≥ 0. We allow for the possibility that ρnm ≤ ρg.9 We ask, is heterogeneity
with respect to time preferences suﬃcient to ensure an equilibrium with positive savings
and positive public pensions? 10
For agents with time preference ρm, the ﬁrst order condition that determines an interior
level of S is given by
u′ (cm
1 ) = Rρm v′ (cm
2 ) ⇔ u′ ((1 − τ)w − Sm(B)) = Rρmv′ (RSm (B) + B); (9)
9The Feldstein formulation assumes ρ
nm = ρ
g = 1 and ρ
m = 0.
10This is interesting not only as a generalization of Feldstein, but also because the literature features
models with a distinction between so-called constrained and unconstrained households, see e.g. Jappelli
and Pagano (1989) and Campell and Mankiw (1991), where the former are deﬁned as liquidity constrained
households and therefore they are "hand in mouth consumers"; i.e. they consume their income, and their
marginal propensity to consume/save is one/zero. The unconstrained are forward looking. In a macro-
context this is important since it introduces Keynesian type demand eﬀects, and implies also that Ricardian
equivalence does not hold. Empirical estimates ﬁnd the fraction of constrained households to be quite high
(70%). Our result shows that this corner (no savings) may arise endogenously due to social security; it does
not have to rely on complete myopia (ρ
m = 0) or some other form of irrationality.O  M         R             S      S        14





2 ) + u′′ (cm
1 )
[u′′ (cm
1 ) + R2ρmv′′ (cm
2 )]
.
The analogous expressions for those with time preference ρnm are given by
u′ (cnm
1 ) = Rρnm v′ (cnm






2 ) + u′′ (cnm
1 )
[u′′ (cnm
1 ) + R2ρnmv′′ (cnm
2 )]
.
The optimal beneﬁt level for the government solves
max
B
U (B) ≡ λ[u(w − B − Sm (B)) + ρgv(RSm (B) + B)]
+(1 − λ)[u(w − B − Snm (B)) + ρgv(RSnm (B) + B)].
The optimal level of B, if positive, is deﬁned as the solution to















































< 0 for R > 1;1 +
∂Snm(B)
∂B > 0 and
R
∂Snm(B)







> 0 ⇔ −
Rρmv′′ (cm
2 ) + u′′ (cm
1 )
[u′′ (cm




2 ) + u′′ (cm
1 ) > u′′ (cm
1 ) + R2ρmv′′ (cm







1 ) + R2ρmv′′ (cm
2 ) − RRρmv′′ (cm
2 ) − Ru′′ (cm
1 )
[u′′ (cm




1 )(1 − R)
[u′′ (cm
1 ) + R2ρmv′′ (cm
2 )]
< 0 for R > 1O  M         R             S      S       
The rest follows.
The next result states that heterogeneity in time preference is not enough to produce
an equilibrium with interior private savings and positive public pensions.
Proposition 4. Irrespective of λ, there does not exist an equilibrium with Sm > 0, Snm >
0, and B > 0 if R > 1.
Proof. It follows from (11) and Lemma 1 that, for interior private savings Sm > 0 and
Snm > 0,

































Note, in passing, that this result does not require that ρnm = ρg holds. We close
this section by proving a corollary to Proposition 4 that states that coexistence of positive
private saving by the non-myopic agents, zero saving by myopic agents, and positive optimal
pensions is possible if the myopic agents are suﬃciently myopic.
Corollary 2. Suppose ρg = ρnm. A necessary condition for an equilibrium with Sm = 0,
Snm > 0 and B > 0 is that ρm < ￿ ρm(λ,R) where ￿ ρm(λ,R) >
ρg
R and ￿ ρm
λ (λ,R) < 0,
￿ ρm
R(λ,R) ⋚ 0.
Proof. The optimal beneﬁt level is determined from
U′ (B) = λv′ (cm
2 )
￿





+(1 − λ)v′ (cnm
2 )
￿







U′ (B) = λ
￿
ρgv′ (cm








+(1 − λ)v′ (cnm
2 )
￿
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If savings by myopic agents are zero, it follows that
∂Sm(B)
∂B = 0; hence the optimal beneﬁt
level, assuming ρg = ρnm, is determined by
U′ (B) = λ
￿
−u′ (cm
1 ) + ρgv′ (cm
2 )
￿
+ (1 − λ)
￿
v′ (cnm
2 )ρg(1 − R)
￿
= 0,
which can be restated as
u′ (cm






2 )(R − 1)
￿
. (12)
Myopic agents do not save if
u′ (cm
1 ) > Rρm v′ (cm
2 )







2 )(R − 1)
￿







2 )(R − 1)
￿
> (Rρm − ρg) v′ (cm
2 ) (13)
A suﬃcient condition for (13) to hold is Rρm − ρg < 0. Suppose Rρm − ρg > 0 instead.
Since Sm = 0 and Snm > 0, we know v′ (cnm
2 ) < v′ (cm






























It is useful to summarize our results thus far. Myopia on the part of agents has been
used to rationalize the existence of public pensions in “high interest” dynamically eﬃcient
economies. We show that while enough myopia may provide a justiﬁcation for public pen-
sions in such economies, private savings would be fully crowded out. Pension pessimism
11Note that this condition also includes Rρ
m − ρ
g < 0.O  M         R             S      S        17
alone is not enough to ensure an interior solution (positive optimal beneﬁts and positive
private savings). Indeed, a necessary condition for such a solution is that there is some
pension pessimism, but myopia can neither be too weak nor too strong. Finally, hetero-
geneity in time preference is not enough either. In the next section, we show that suﬃcient
myopia and a concave neoclassical technology can produce an equilibrium with positive
optimal beneﬁts and positive private savings.
3. T                                     
In this section, we make one important change to the structure developed thus far: we
replace the linear storage technology with a neoclassical technology. Speciﬁcally, assume the
single ﬁnal good is produced using a standard neoclassical production function F(Kt,Lt)
where Kt denotes the capital input and Lt denotes the labor input at t. The ﬁnal good
can either be consumed in the period it is produced, or it can be saved to yield capital at
the very beginning of the following period. Capital is assumed to depreciate 100% between
periods. Let kt ≡ Kt/Lt denote the capital-labor ratio (capital per young agent). Then,
output per young agent at time t may be expressed as f(kt) where f(kt) ≡ F(Kt/Lt,1) is
the intensive production function. We assume that f(0) = 0, f′ > 0 > f′′, and that the
usual Inada conditions hold.
There are two implications of moving to a model with neoclassical technology: the
exogenous endowment w is replaced by a wage income, and the return on saving, R, is
replaced by the marginal product of capital, both of which endogenously evolve with the
economy.12 For convenience, assume that agents are endowed with one unit of labor when
young and are retired when old. Since agents do not value leisure, they supply their labor
endowment inelastically to the labor market at the market determined wage rate, w. We
assume that factor markets are perfectly competitive, and thus factors of production are
12For future use, bear in mind that Feldstein (1985) assumes R to be exogenously ﬁxed — in eﬀect, he
assumes R
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paid their marginal product in each period. Then
Rt+1 = f′ (kt+1) (14)
and
wt = f (kt) − ktf′ (kt) ≡ w(kt), (15)
where w′ (k) = −kR′ (k) > 0,∀k.
Since the private agent takes R and w as given, the ﬁrst order condition to the myopic
agent’s problem remains the same as in (1) above, reproduced below as:
u′ (c1,t) = Rt+1ρv′ (c2,t+1) ⇒ u′ ((1 − τ)wt − St) = Rt+1ρv′ (Rt+1St + B). (16)
In equilibrium, St = kt+1; then using (14)-(15) and the government budget constraint,
τwt = Bt, eq. (16) may be written as
u′ (w(kt) − B − kt+1) = R(kt+1)ρv′ (R(kt+1)kt+1 + B). (17)
Eq. (17) characterizes the equilibrium law of motion for the capital-labor ratio. All com-
petitive equilibria, both stationary and non-stationary, are characterized by (17). A steady
state k is a time-invariant solution to (17). Note that (17) may be “solved” to yield
kt+1 = S [w(kt),R(kt+1)]. (18)







; SR = −
ρRS [ ]v′′ ( ) + v′ ( )
F
(19)
where F ≡ u′′ ( ) + R2ρv′′ ( ) < 0. It is clear Sw > 0. Henceforth, assume SR ≥ 0. Such an
assumption is warranted for two reasons: a) it has very strong empirical support, and b)
it rules out the possibility of endogenous cycles in k (see Azariadis, 1993).O  M         R             S      S        19




u′′ (c1) + R(k)ρv′′ (c2)
u′′ (c1)w′ (k) − u′′ (c1) − R′ (k)ρv′ (c2) − R(k)ρv′′ (c2)[R′ (k)k + R(k)]
. (20)
The next result is a short detour; it uses Samuelson’s correspondence principle to establish
a well-known proposition regarding crowding out of private saving by public pensions.
Lemma 2. At a locally stable steady state, ∂k
∂B < 0.
Proof. The numerator in (20) has negative sign. We now use a stability condition to




−Sw ( )SR′ (k)
1 − SR ( )R′ (k)
< 1 ⇔ 0 < 1 + R′ (k)[SSw − SR] (21)
must hold. Using (19), and S = k, it follows that






















The denominator of (20) may be written as
−
￿
u′′kR′ (k) + u′′ + R′ (k)ρv′ (.) + Rρv′′ (.)R′ (k)k + R2ρv′′ (.)
￿
which has the same sign as the expression in (22). This proves ∂k
∂B < 0 at a stable steady
state.
We now return to the central focus of the paper. Is there a role for public pensions
in this economy with myopic agents if the starting point is a dynamically eﬃcient steady
state? As a benchmark, consider ﬁrst the case of no myopia, i.e., ρp = ρg = ρ. The
government, in this case, chooses the optimal B by solving
max
B
U (B) = u(w(k) − B − k(B)) + v (R(k)k(B) + B).O  M         R             S      S       
Using (16), we get




























The importance of neoclassical technology is now apparent. For in its absence, R′ (k) =
0 would obtain and then U′ (B) ≤ 0 would hold at a dynamically eﬃcient (R(k) > 1) steady
state. In other words, we would get the same result as Proposition 1. As an aside, note that
Lemma 2 ensures that at a locally stable steady state, R′ (k) ∂k
∂B > 0 holds, which implies
that the neoclassical technology in the absence of myopia is not suﬃcient to generate a
role for public pensions. This last remark is really to be understood as a re-statement of
the main result in Samuelson (1975).
Proposition 5. (Samuelson, 1975) At a locally-stable, dynamically-eﬃcient, initial steady
state, there is no role for public pensions.
Now suppose agents are myopic, i.e., ρ < 1. Can myopia along with neoclassical tech-
nology restore a role for publicly-funded pensions? Assuming an interior solution, we ﬁnd
that the optimal B is characterized by U′ (B) = 0 where





















1 + kR′ (k)
￿






an expression analogous to (23). We are now ready to state our main result.
Proposition 6. Under suﬃciently high myopia (ρ < 1
R(k)), a necessary condition for the
existence of a dynamically eﬃcient steady state equilibrium with positive savings and
positive public pensions is R′ (k)  = 0.
Proof. It follows from (24) that





(1 − Rρ)kR′ (k) + R(1 − ρ)
(25)O  M         R             S      S        21
implying that from the point of view of the government, the optimal response of capital to
a change in pensions is given by (25). As before, compare this to the same from the point
of view of the agent — captured by (20). At an equilibrium with interior k and B, these
two responses must be equal; hence
(Rρ − 1)
(1 − Rρ)kR′ (k) + R(1 − ρ)
=
u′′ (c1) + R(k)ρv′′ (c2)
u′′ (c1)w′ (k) − u′′ (c1) − R′ (k)ρv′ (c2) − R(k)ρv′′ (c2)[R′ (k)k + R(k)]
must hold. Routine manipulation and re-arrangement of terms in (??) yield
−[R(k)ρ − 1]R′ (k)ρv′ (c2) = (R(k) − 1)
￿
[R(k)]
2 ρ2v′′ (c2) + u′′ (c1)
￿
(27)
It is clear that at a dynamically eﬃcient steady state, the r.h.s of (27) is negative; in that
case, R′ (k) = 0 would present a contradiction. In fact, since R′ (k) < 0, for (27) to hold,
it is necessary that Rρ−1 < 0 holds. Combining Rρ < 1 with the requirement that R > 1
implies ρ should be small enough.
Notice that Proposition 6 goes through for a constant R′ (k). Also note that R′ (k)  = 0
is necessary but not suﬃcient for eq. (27) to have a unique positive solution in B.
Finally, we oﬀer some intuition for our main result. Suppose the return to saving is
identical to the marginal product of capital and that the latter is falling in capital. Public
pensions have two eﬀects on private saving (in the form of capital). By raising future
income, they depress the need for private saving — the income eﬀect. But, as private saving
falls, the return to saving rises — the interest-rate eﬀect — and this prevents private saving
from getting completely crowded out, as in Corollary 1.
4. C                 
It is well understood that PAYG social security, a dominant and long-standing institution
in developed economies, has no welfare role in dynamically eﬃcient economies. In fact,
the most common justiﬁcation for public pensions in such economies relies on the notion
of myopia — agents discounting near dates much less than distant dates. In this paper,
we revisit the theoretical underpinnings of myopia as a rationale for social security. WeO  M         R             S      S        22
ﬁnd that in a dynamically eﬃcient OG economy with a linear exogenous-return storage
technology and exogenous young-age endowments, positive levels of optimal public pensions
and private saving cannot coexist. In fact, a necessary condition for such coexistence is
that capital be available as a productive resource and that the production technology be
neoclassical.O  M         R             S      S        23
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